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ABSTRACT 
Conflicts of interest (COI) in healthcare have increasingly gained attention in the lay 
press as well as among healthcare professionals. COIs increase the risk of undue influence 
on professional decision-making and may have far-reaching consequences in healthcare. 
Therefore, it is essential to develop strategies to deal with such risk situations in order to 
prevent negative outcomes for patients and the health care system. This article describes 
recent research on COIs in Germany as well as initiatives aiming at more transparency 
and better management of COIs in Germany. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
   A conflict of interest (COI) has been defined as a set of circumstances that creates a risk 
that a professional judgement or action regarding a primary interest will be unduly in-
fluenced by a secondary interest.1 In healthcare, the primary interest of a doctor or a 
medical researcher is the well-being of the patient – either directly when treating a pa-
tient or indirectly via valid research that benefits patients. Secondary interests can be of 
very different natures, from financial interests to interactions with industry and intellec-
tual interests such as the allegiance to a certain therapy. 
 
It is important to note that a COI represents a risk factor for biased decision-making. 
COIs do not necessarily lead to an influenced decision and they are not necessarily 
caused by wrongdoing. On the contrary, they are ubiquitous and often unavoidable. As 
such, they are not always an issue of compliance, neither in the strict sense of the word 
nor in a broader ethical sense. However, they can become an issue of compliance when 
they are not made transparent as required, or when they are not managed appropriately 
to reduce their risk of bias. 
 
In healthcare, COIs are a controversial topic, especially those arising from interactions 
between industry and physicians. These interactions constitute COIs because the indus-
try’s primary interest is profit and not the well-being of the patient. Industry may there-
fore influence professional medical decisions to the possible harm of patients. However, 
physician-industry interactions may also have beneficial effects when collaborations on 
research lead to the development of better therapeutic strategies. This leads to contro-
versy between those warning against negative consequences of industry interactions and 
those fearing obstacles for research if interactions are regulated too strictly. 
 
Interactions between industry and physicians are common,2 and there is a large body of 
evidence showing that these COIs may lead to decisions that are potentially harmful to 
patients. There is evidence that they may lead to higher prescriptions in general and 
specifically of patented drugs to the benefit of industry as well as to prescriptions not in 			
1
 Dennis F. Thompson, Understanding financial conflicts of interest, THE NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF 
MEDICINE, 329 (1993) and  Bernard Lo & Marilyn  J. Field, Free Executive Summary, in Conflict of Interest 
in Medical Research, Education, and Practice (Bernard Lo & Marilyn  J. Field eds., 2009). 
2
  Eric  G. Campbell, Doctors and drug companies--scrutinizing influential relationships, Dennis F. Thompson, 
Understanding financial conflicts of interest, THE NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF MEDICINE, 357 (2007)., Eric  
G. Campbell et al., Institutional academic industry relationships, THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN MEDICAL 
ASSOCIATION,  298 (2007)., Eric G. Campbell et al., Physician professionalism and changes in physician-
industry relationships from 2004 to 2009, ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE, 170  (2010)., and Klaus Lieb & 
Simone Brandtönies, A survey of german physicians in private practice about contacts with pharmaceutical 
sales representatives, DEUTSCHES ÄRZTEBLATT INTERNATIONAL, 107 (2010). 
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line with clinical guidelines.3 In addition, associations with biased trial designs,4 biased 
publication of trial results5 and biased assessments of drug safety and efficacy6 have been 
found.7  
 
Financial COIs arising from interactions with industry have been the main focus of COI 
research and debate. However, it is important to note that COIs may also arise from 
non-financial interests, such as allegiance to a certain type of therapy, membership in 
professional societies, or individual research focus. There has been much less research 
into how these COIs might influence different aspects of medical doctors’ decision-
making.8 
 
Considering the importance of unbiased decision-making in healthcare, it is essential to 
develop strategies to prevent or at least reduce bias resulting from COIs. A growing 
body of literature addresses the adequate management of COIs in different areas of 
health care. One publication that was especially influential is the Institute of Medicines 
(IOM) report of 2009, “Conflict of Interest in Medical Research, Education, and Prac-
tice” by Lo and Field.9 It gives an overview of COIs in healthcare and suggests strategies 
for their management in different contexts. It describes the ultimate goals of COI poli-
cies as “maintaining the integrity of professional judgment and sustaining public confi-
dence in that judgment”. 
 
Most COI research has been performed in the US, Australia and the UK. In Germany, 			
3
  Klaus Lieb & Armin Scheurich, Contact between Doctors and the Pharmaceutical Industry, Their 
Perceptions, and the Effects on Prescribing Habits, PLOS ONE , 9 (2014). and Geoffrey K. Spurling et al., 
Information from pharmaceutical companies and the quality, quantity, and cost of physicians' prescribing: A 
systematic review,  PLOS MEDICINE, 7 (2010). 
4
  Andreas Lundh et al., Industry sponsorship and research outcome, THE COCHRANE DATABASE OF 
SYSTEMATIC REVIEWS, 12 (2012) , Maria E. Flacco et al., Head-to-head randomized trials are mostly industry 
sponsored and almost always favor the industry sponsor, JOURNAL OF CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY,  68 (2015). 
5
 Justin E. Bekelman et al., Scope and impact of financial conflicts of interest in biomedical research: a systematic 
review, THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION,  289 (2003) and Gisela Schott et al., The 
financing of drug trials by pharmaceutical companies and its consequences. Part 1: A qualitative, systematic 
review of the literature on possible influences on the findings, protocols, and quality of drug trials,  
DEUTSCHES ÄRZTEBLATT INTERNATIONAL , 107 (2010). 
6
  Amy T. Wang et al., Association between industry affiliation and position on cardiovascular risk with 
rosiglitazone: Cross sectional systematic review,  BRITISH MEDICAL JOURNAL,  340 (2010)  and Adam G. 
Dunn et al., Financial conflicts of interest and conclusions about neuraminidase inhibitors for influenza: an 
analysis of systematic reviews, ANNALS OF INTERNAL MEDICINE,  161  (2014). 
7
  Lisa Cosgrove et al., Under the Influence: The Interplay among Industry, Publishing, and Drug Regulation, 
ACCOUNTABILITY IN RESEARCH,  23 (2016)  gives a good overview of the topic using a recent case study. 
8
  Alexander M. Clark et al., Addressing conflict of interest in non-pharmacological research, THE 
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CLINICAL PRACTICE, 69 (2015) , Klaus Lieb et al., Conflicts of interest and 
spin in reviews of psychological therapies: a systematic review, BRITISH MEDICAL JOURNAL OPEN, 6 (2016). 
9
  Bernard Lo & Marilyn  J. Field, Free Executive Summary, in Conflict of Interest in Medical Research, 
Education, and Practice (Bernard Lo & Marilyn  J. Field eds., 2009). 
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COI research has only begun to gather momentum in the past few years. Initiatives such 
as the “no free lunch” 10 organization MEZIS, Transparency International and Neurolo-
gyFirst have additionally stimulated interest in the topic. This article will therefore focus 
on recent developments in Germany regarding COIs and their management in 
healthcare. 
 
We will start by giving an overview of research on the frequency of and attitudes toward 
COIs among physicians and medical students especially with regard to the pharmaceuti-
cal industry in Germany. Then, we will describe different initiatives that have made 
efforts to improve the management of COIs in healthcare in Germany. Such efforts 
have focused firstly on how to make COIs transparent, and secondly on how to develop 
adequate strategies to reduce their resulting bias.   
II. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN MEDICINE – SURVEY DATA FROM GER-
MANY 
 
   As mentioned above, most existing data on COIs in healthcare are from the US, Aus-
tralia and the UK. However, considering the differences in health care policy in different 
countries, research results from one country may not be representative of another. In 
recent years, there has been a growing number of German contributions to COI-
research.  In the following section, they will be discussed in the context of evidence from 
the above mentioned countries. 
 
A. Survey on Medical Professionals’ Interactions with Industry in Germany 
 
In Germany, the first survey of physicians’ interactions with pharmaceutical sales repre-
sentatives (PSRs) was done in 2006, funded by a trust associated with the professional 
society of registered doctors in Germany.11 While the response rate was low (11%), it had 
similar results to later independent surveys. German doctors were visited by PSRs on 
average seven times per week and most physicians (63%) considered these interactions to 
be valuable. The first independent study by our group in 2008 questioned 300 random-
ly selected doctors from a sample of cardiologists, neurologists/psychiatrists and primary 
care physicians (response rate 69.3%, n=208).12 Almost 80% of the surveyed doctors 
received at least one weekly visit from PSRs, while almost 20% received daily visits. Al-
most all doctors had received gifts and/or pharmaceutical samples from industry within 
the last year (96% and 92%, respectively). These percentages are higher than in the US, 
where in 2010, about 80% of surveyed doctors reported relationships with drug compa-			
10
  „No free lunch“ is an organization of healthcare providers that tries to encourage evidence-based prescribing 
independent of industry influence., see www.nofreelunch.org 
11
  KLAUS GEBUHR, DER PHARMAREFERENT IN DER BEWERTUNG DER VERTRAGSÄRZTESCHAFT (2008). 
12
  Klaus Lieb & Simone Brandtönies, A survey of german physicians in private practice about contacts with 
pharmaceutical sales representatives , DEUTSCHES ÄRZTEBLATT INTERNATIONAL, 107  (2010). 
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nies and just over 60% of doctors reported receiving drug samples13. In this 2010 study, a 
trend of decreasing interactions in the US was reported compared with an earlier study 
from 2007.14 A similar trend has not been found in Germany, where a survey from 2011 
found similar rates to the previous one.15 
 
In Germany, most doctors in the 2008 survey stated that the PSRs were trying to influ-
ence their prescribing patterns most of the time. However, few doctors considered 
themselves to be influenced by PSRs, while they were more likely to believe this of their 
colleagues.16 This phenomenon of a so-called “bias blind spot” has been described in 
many other studies, where medical doctors consistently underestimate their own risk of 
being influenced by COIs.17 
 
Another German study focused on the impact of interactions between doctors and in-
dustry. An online survey by our group in 2011 asked 1,386 medical doctors (response rate 
11.5%; n = 160) with a prescription volume of > €100,000 (psychiatrists, neurologists, 
general practitioners or internal medicine specialists) or >€20,000 (cardiologists) per 
quarter about their interactions with industry in the previous year and correlated those 
interactions with their overall prescription data during the same time period.18 We 
found an association between the acceptance of office stationery, the attendance of 
sponsored continuing medical education (CME) events and the perception of being 
adequately and accurately informed by drug representatives with changes in overall 
prescription data of the doctors. The acceptance of office stationery was associated with 
prescriptions of higher daily doses per patient in general and more prescriptions of ge-
nerics.  Attendance at sponsored CME events was associated with the prescription of a 
higher proportion of on-patent branded drugs and a higher expenditure for off-patent 
branded drugs per patient. While this survey was not able to prove causality, it adds to 
the body of evidence suggesting that interactions with industry influences the prescrib-			
13
  Eric G. Campbell et al., Physician professionalism and changes in physician-industry relationships from 2004 
to 2009,  ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE, 170 (2010). 
14
  Eric G. Campbell, Doctors and drug companies--scrutinizing influential relationships, THE NEW ENGLAND 
JOURNAL OF MEDICINE, 357 (2007). 
15
  Klaus Lieb & Armin Scheurich, Contact between Doctors and the Pharmaceutical Industry, Their 
Perceptions, and the Effects on Prescribing Habits,  PLOS ONE,  (2014). 
16
  Klaus Lieb & Simone Brandtönies, A survey of german physicians in private practice about contacts with 
pharmaceutical sales representatives , DEUTSCHES ÄRZTEBLATT INTERNATIONAL, 107 (2010). 
17
  Joyce Ehrlinger et al., Peering into the bias blind spot: people's assessments of bias in themselves and others, 
PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN, 31 (2005), Ashley Wazana, Physicians and the 
pharmaceutical industry: Is a gift ever just a gift?, THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION,  
283 (2000)  and Daniella A. Zipkin & Michael A. Steinman, Interactions between pharmaceutical 
representatives and doctors in training. A thematic review, JOURNAL OF GENERAL INTERNAL MEDICINE,  
20 (2005). 
18
  Klaus Lieb & Armin Scheurich, Contact between Doctors and the Pharmaceutical Industry, Their 
Perceptions, and the Effects on Prescribing Habits,  PLOS ONE,  (2014). 
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ing behavior of physicians.19 
 
To the best of our knowledge, there have been only two studies on the interactions be-
tween medical students and industry in Germany. The first one conducted by our 
group in 2011 was a survey of 1,151 medical students at eight randomly selected German 
universities (response rate 90%).20 All but 12% of the students had received at least one 
gift from a pharmaceutical company or participated in an event sponsored by a pharma-
ceutical company. Most common gifts were small, non-informational gifts such as mugs 
or tourniquets (65%). Another simultaneous study that was done at only one German 
university showed similar results, with 80% of students having received some kind of 
gift from the pharmaceutical industry and 44% of students having had direct contact 
with a PSR.21 
 
Both surveys also assessed students’ attitudes toward these interactions. Both studies 
found that students found more expensive gifts less appropriate.22 In our study, almost 
half of the students considered it appropriate to accept gifts because the students be-
lieved that they have only minimal influence on them or because they considered them-
selves to be in a bad financial situation, respectively. We also found that students were 
more likely to believe that their fellow students were influenced by gifts than that they 
themselves were influenced by gifts, showing a blind spot in medical students compara-
ble to that in doctors. 40% of students considered sponsored educational events to be 
biased and at the same time helpful and informative.23 We also surveyed medical schools’ 
deans and student affairs’ deans regarding policies and lectures on COIs.24 Only one of 
36 medical schools in Germany had a policy governing the interactions between medical 
students and industry and only six schools (20%) offered lectures on the topic. Conse-
quently, we found that most students (77.8%) would like to learn more about interac-
tions with PSRs. 
 			
19
  Geoffrey K. Spurling et al., Information from pharmaceutical companies and the quality, quantity, and cost 
of physicians' prescribing: A systematic review, PLOS MEDICINE, 7 (2010), James S. Yeh et al., Association of 
Industry Payments to Physicians With the Prescribing of Brand-name Statins in Massachusetts,  THE 
JOURNAL OF AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION INTERNAL MEDICINE, 176 (2016). 
20
  Klaus Lieb & Cora Koch, Medical students' attitudes to and contact with the pharmaceutical industry: a 
survey at eight German university hospitals, DEUTSCHES ÄRZTEBLATT INTERNATIONAL,  110 (2013). 
21
  Kristine Jahnke et al., German medical students' exposure and attitudes toward pharmaceutical promotion: a 
cross-sectional survey, GMS ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR MEDIZINISCHE AUSBILDUNG, 31 (2014). 
22
  Id. at. and Klaus Lieb & Cora Koch, Medical students' attitudes to and contact with the pharmaceutical 
industry: a survey at eight German university hospitals, DEUTSCHES ÄRZTEBLATT INTERNATIONAL,  110 
(2013). 
23
  Klaus Lieb & Cora Koch, Medical students' attitudes to and contact with the pharmaceutical industry: a 
survey at eight German university hospitals, DEUTSCHES ÄRZTEBLATT INTERNATIONAL,  110 (2013). 
24
  Klaus Lieb & Cora Koch, Conflicts of interest in medical school: missing policies and high need for student 
information at most German universities, GMS ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR MEDIZINISCHE AUSBILDUNG,  31 (2014). 
			
	  COMPLIANCE  ELLIANCE  JOURNAL   |   VOLUME 2   NUMBER 2   2016 
CORA KOCH, GISELA SCHOTT, DAVID KLEMPERER, THOMAS LEMPERT, WOLF-DIETER LUDWIG & KLAUS LIEB |   
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN MEDICINE AND THEIR MANAGEMENT 
 
PAGE  11 
B. Survey of Patients’ Views on Medical Professionals’ Interactions with Indus-
try in Germany 
 
There has been generally little research on the awareness and attitudes of patients with 
regard to COIs of their treating physicians. In Germany, a survey conducted by our 
group in 2012/2013 shed some light on this topic.25 As expected, most of the 765 surveyed 
patients (response rate 80%; n = 612) said that it was important to them that decisions 
by their doctors were made only in their best interest. However, patients were generally 
not well informed about possible COIs their doctors could have and underestimated the 
frequency with which doctors interacted with PSRs. In addition, only very few patients 
expected that their doctor could be unduly influenced by COIs. Still, most patients 
would welcome transparency regarding COIs of their doctors and expected their trust in 
their doctors to increase if they were to disclose secondary interests.  
III. GERMAN INITIATIVES FOR IMPROVED TRANSPARENCY OF CONFLICTS 
OF INTEREST FOR MEDICAL DOCTORS 
 
  The first and essential step in the management of COIs is to make them transparent, so 
that in turn, strategies can be developed to reduce the risk of bias resulting from them. 
Nevertheless, research has shown that COIs continue to be underreported in many con-
texts.26 In the US, the Physician Payments Sunshine Act (PPSA), as part of the Afforda-
ble Care Act, mandates the publication of payments from the pharmaceutical and medi-
cal device industry to physicians since 2012. The PPSA is one of the most prominent and 
largest transparency initiatives with regard to COIs in healthcare globally. Since its initi-
ation, it has published 15.71 million payments with a total value of 9.92 billion Dollars.27 
A similar law in Germany does not appear on the horizon. However, there are several 
German initiatives that have worked to increase transparency regarding COIs for medi-
cal doctors and medical advisors. We will describe steps that have been taken by the 
Drug Commission of the German Medical Association (DCGMA) as well as the Associ-
ation of Research-Based Pharmaceutical Companies (VfA) in cooperation with the asso-
ciation Voluntary Self-regulation for the Pharmaceutical Industry (FSA). In addition, 
we will discuss how transparency with regard to non-financial COIs could be improved.  
 			
25
  Elena  M. Riedl et al., Patient attitudes and expectations towards conflicts of interest of attending physicians, 
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR EVIDENZ, FORTBILDUNG UND QUALITÄT IM GESUNDHEITSWESEN,  110-111 Z (2016). 
26
  Michelle Roseman et al., Reporting of conflicts of interest in meta-analyses of trials of pharmacological 
treatments, THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, 305 (2011), Michelle Roseman et al., 
Reporting of conflicts of interest from drug trials in Cochrane reviews: cross sectional study, BRITISH MEDICAL 
JOURNAL, 345 (2012), Shanil Ebrahim et al., Meta-analyses with industry involvement are massively published 
and report no caveats for antidepressants, JOURNAL OF CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY,  70 (2016). 
27
  Department of Health and Human Services and Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Annual Report 
to Congress on the Open Payments Program (2016), available at 
https://www.cms.gov/OpenPayments/Downloads/Open-Payments-Report-to-Congress.pdf. 
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While transparency is a prerequisite for the better management of COIs, it is important 
to note that bias is not eliminated if hidden COIs are made transparent.28 Furthermore, 
it has been shown that the declaration of COIs may have negative consequences, e.g. by 
leading to a strategic exaggeration of bias by the person declaring the COI or by increas-
ing the burden on patients to follow their doctors’ recommendations so as not to appear 
to mistrust them.29 Nevertheless, if doctors declare their COIs, this openness about 
COIs may motivate them to reduce their COIs in the future.30 In sum, transparency can 
only be a first step of COI management and has to be followed by measures that are 
useful in reducing the resulting bias. 
 
A. The Drug Commission of the German Medical Association (DCGMA) 
 
The Drug Commission of the German Medical Association is a scientific expert com-
mittee of the German Medical Association (GMA) for drug-related matters. Its main 
tasks are to advise the GMA on questions of pharmaceutical policy, to assess benefits of 
pharmaceuticals, to document and assess adverse drug reactions and to keep the medical 
public up to date on rational drug therapy and drug safety.31 These important and influ-
ential tasks necessitate a high level of independence from secondary interests among the 
currently 37 full and 130 associate members. Within the DCGMA, the expert committee 
for transparency and independence in medicine aims to strengthen the independence of 
DCGMA members as well as the broader community of medical doctors.32 It was initi-
ated in 2014 and develops strategies to declare, prevent and manage conflicts of interest. 
Before this, the DCGMA had already begun to address COIs in a less formal working 
group established in 2003. 
 
It has been shown that COIs tend to be underreported if questioning is not specific 
enough or leaves the judgment of whether a secondary interest is relevant or not to the 
person declaring the secondary interests.33 To increase transparency of members’ COIs, 
the DCGMA has developed a questionnaire to register its members’ secondary interests 			
28
  Sheldon Krimsky, Combating the funding effect in science: What's beyond transparency?, STANFORD LAW 
POLICY REVIEW,  XXI (2010). 
29
  George Loewenstein et al., The limits of transparency: Pitfalls and potential of disclosing conflicts of interest, 
THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 101 (2011). 
30
  ARCHON FUNG et al., FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS AND PROMISE OF TRANSPARENCY   (Cambridge 
University Press. 2007). 
31
       Arzneimittelkommission der deutschen Ärzteschaft, Drug Commission of the German Medical Association, 
available at http://www.akdae.de/en/index.html. 
32
   Arzneimittelkommission der deutschen Ärzteschaft, Expert Committee for Transparency and Independence 
in Medicine, available at 
http://www.akdae.de/Kommission/Organisation/Mitglieder/Fachausschuesse/Transparenz/eng/Transpare
ncy/index.html. 
33
  Bernard Lo & Marilyn  J. Field, Free Executive Summary, in Conflict of Interest in Medical Research, 
Education, and Practice (Bernard Lo & Marilyn  J. Field eds., 2009). 
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based on the above-mentioned IOM-report. It asks for COIs arising from different 
types of interactions with “institutions”, defined as pharmaceutical or medical device 
companies, health insurance providers or other interest groups. Interactions that are 
asked for include employment, consultancy work, personal remuneration for lectures, 
CME events or authorship of scientific publications, third party funding for research, 
shares or patents, and active membership in professional associations, specialist societies, 
or other interest groups.34 
 
Since 2014, the COIs of the last three years of the current full and associate members are 
publicly accessible on the website of the DCGMA. The amount of payments received in 
2014 was additionally published for full members in 2015.35 The publication of the 
amount of payments received by associate members is planned in 2016 for the year 2015.  
These measures ensure a high degree of transparency not only among members but also 
for the public. Informing the public aims to increase public trust in the DCGMA. An 
unpublished analysis of the development of COIs over the last several years has shown 
that relationships between DCGMA members and the pharmaceutical industry have 
decreased considerably, underlining the successful work of the DCGMA in their efforts 
to decrease the number of members with COIs and confirming that transparency may 
decrease interactions with industry. 
 
As mentioned above, however, mere transparency does not prevent bias. The DCGMA 
has therefore developed ways to manage COIs that are described in more detail below. 
 
B. The Association of Research-Based Pharmaceutical Companies (VfA) 
 
The Association of Research-Based Pharmaceutical Companies (VfA) is a lobby group 
for German pharmaceutical manufacturers. It represents 45 member companies and 
over 100 of their subsidiaries, representing about 70% of the German pharmaceutical 
market.36 Its members have declared to abide by certain codes specified by the associa-
tion Voluntary Self-regulation for the Pharmaceutical Industry (FSA) concerning for 
example the interaction between the member companies with health care professionals 
or patient organizations. In 2013, a new “transparency codex” was published with the 
goal of bringing more transparency into interactions between pharmaceutical manufac-
turers and other cooperating partners within the health care system. This was a reaction 
to the announcement by the European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and 
Associations (EFPIA) in 2012 to publish payments to doctors and other healthcare pro-			
34
  The questionnaire is available at 
http://www.akdae.de/Kommission/Organisation/Statuten/Interessenkonflikte/Interessenkonflikte.doc (in 
German) 
35
   Arzneimittelkommission der deutschen Ärzteschaft, Ordentliche Mitglieder, available at 
http://www.akdae.de/Kommission/Organisation/Mitglieder/OM/index.html. 
36
  Frank Gailberger, Verband und Mitglieder (2016), available at http://www.vfa.de/de/verband-mitglieder. 
			
	  COMPLIANCE  ELLIANCE  JOURNAL   |   VOLUME 2   NUMBER 2   2016 
CORA KOCH, GISELA SCHOTT, DAVID KLEMPERER, THOMAS LEMPERT, WOLF-DIETER LUDWIG & KLAUS LIEB |   
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN MEDICINE AND THEIR MANAGEMENT 
 
PAGE  14 
fessionals.37 
 
In June of 2016, the first disclosure report declared payments of € 575,000,000 to Ger-
man doctors and hospitals.38 Most, though not all, member companies have also pub-
lished their individual payments to doctors, where doctors consented to publication.39 
According to the VfA, only about one third of doctors consented to the publication of 
their data, but where consent was not given, aggregated anonymous data were pub-
lished.40  In principle, the transparency codex is similar to the PPSA: Pharmaceutical 
companies publish the payments they make to physicians or other health care profes-
sionals.41 The commitment is laudable, if it is well implemented. However, there are 
some important differences that make this codex less likely to succeed than the PPSA in 
arriving at full transparency of medical doctors` interactions with the pharmaceutical 
industry. 
 
The first and most obvious difference is that the German code is voluntary, whereas the 
PPSA is a law and therefore mandates publication of payments. It is therefore to be 
expected that companies will not establish full transparency.42 A study on the quality of 
non-interventional studies from 2012 found that member companies of the VfA only 
rarely complied with their own requirements for non-interventional studies.43 The VfA 
therefore does not have a trustable track record regarding compliance with its own rules. 
Additionally, the sanctions for non-compliance remain vague in the transparency codex 
of the FSA, further questioning the true commitment to transparency. Lastly, due to 
strict data protection laws in Germany, publication depends on the permission of indi-
vidual doctors that their data can be published. As mentioned above, about two thirds 
of doctors have refused to allow the publication of their data and it seems plausible to 
			
37
  Ärzte erhielten 2015 rund 575 Millionen Euro von Pharmafirmen, DEUTSCHES ÄRZTEBLATT 2016 available 
at http://www.aerzteblatt.de/nachrichten/68213/#. 
38
  Verband Forschender Arzneimittelhersteller e.V., Pressemitteilung 015/2016: Transparenzkodex zeigt 
Forschungsstärke (2016), available at http://www.vfa.de/de/presse/pressemitteilungen/pm-015-2016-
transparenzkodex-zeigt-forschungsstaerke.html. 
39
  Holger Diener, Veröffentlichungen (2016), available at http://www.pharma-
transparenz.de/fachkreisangehoerige/veroeffentlichungen/. 
40
  Ärzte erhielten 2015 rund 575 Millionen Euro von Pharmafirmen, DEUTSCHES ÄRZTEBLATT 2016. 
41
  FSA e.V., Code of Transparency of the Association of Voluntary Self-Control of the Pharmaceutical Industry 
(Verein Freiwillige Selbstkontrolle für die Arzneimittelindustrie - FSA) for interaction with Healthcare 
Professionals and Healthcare Organisations (2013), available at http://www.fsa-
pharma.de/fileadmin/Downloads/Pdf_s/Kodizes__Empfehlungen/Transparency_Code.pdf. 
42
  Margaret McCartney, Margaret McCartney: Optional disclosure of payments is pointless, BRITISH MEDICAL 
JOURNAL, 354 (2016). 
43
  Beatrice K. J. G. von Jeinsen & Thomas Sudhop, A 1-year cross-sectional analysis of non-interventional post-
marketing study protocols submitted to the German Federal Institute for Drugs and Medical Devices 
(BfArM), THE EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 1453, 69 (2013). 
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assume that these include those that have received high payments or have many COIs.44 
Consequently, a continued lack of full transparency regarding COI of individual doctors 
is likely. Even in the US, about 40% of the data remain unpublished because of unre-
solved disputes between doctors and industry.45 
 
Another disadvantage of the VfA/FSA transparency initiative is a practical one. While in 
the US, all data of payments to doctors are published on a single website 
(https://openpaymentsdata.cms.gov/), the FSA has compiled a list of links to individual 
company websites.46 This makes it time consuming to search for payments to specific 
doctors or to analyze the data for certain specialties (all payments made to cardiologists, 
for example), both important in bringing more transparency to the situation. 
 
Even if all member companies of the VfA/FSA comply with the transparency codex, 
there will still be a lack of transparency for those pharmaceutical companies which are 
not members of the VfA as well as all medical device manufacturers. While this is not a 
criticism of the VfA/FSA, as they have no control over non-members, it does illustrate 
the need for a legal basis for transparency if one aims to arrive at full transparency. 
  
On the other hand, considering that transparency is only a first step and can have unin-
tended negative consequences by itself,47 it is also important to consider the costs of 
such a transparency legislation. The implementation of full transparency through a legal 
mandate in Germany would be very expensive; the costs of the PPSA  have been esti-
mated at $269 million during the first year of implementation and at $180 million each 
following year.48  
 
In conclusion, while there are many critical points regarding the German FSA transpar-
ency codex, it is a positive first step towards more transparency, especially considering 
that at the moment, there is no better alternative in Germany. 
 
C. Transparency of Non-financial Conflicts of Interest 
 
While the transparency of financial COIs has markedly improved in pharmaceutical and 
medical device research within the last few years, non-financial COIs are declared less 
often. Their effect on research methodology or outcomes has also been researched less 			
44
  Nigel Hawkes, Doctors getting biggest payments from drug companies don't declare them on new website, 
BRITISH MEDICAL JOURNAL, 354 (2016). 
45
  Sachi Santhakumar & Eli Y. Adashi, The physician payment sunshine act: Testing the value of transparency, 
THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION,  313 (2015). 
46
  Holger Diener, Veröffentlichungen (2016). 
47
 George Loewenstein et al., The Limits of Transparency: Pitfalls and Potential of Disclosing Conflicts of 
Interest, THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 423  (2011). 
48
  Elizabeth Richardson et al., Health Policy Brief: The Physician Payments Sunshine Act, HEALTH AFFAIRS 
(2014). 
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extensively.49 One area of research and practice where these types of COIs are relevant 
and have also been investigated in some detail is psychotherapy. In this context, alle-
giance to a certain type of psychotherapy constitutes a non-financial COI that might 
influence the framing of research questions, the interpretation of results, the decision to 
publish certain results and not others, or the type of psychotherapy recommended to a 
patient. Allegiance describes the belief that a certain treatment is superior.50 It may be 
due to training in this particular type of treatment or active involvement in the devel-
opment of an etiological model of this treatment, among other factors.51 Allegiance was 
shown to be associated with the outcome of psychotherapy studies with a moderate 
effect size in a large meta-meta-analysis by Munder and colleagues in 2013.52 
 
A recent study by our group investigated the transparency of non-financial COIs in 
reviews on the efficacy of psychological therapies and addressed the question whether 
these COIs influenced authors` interpretations of study results.53 Among the 95 reviews 
studied, only in 4 reviews (4.2%) were non-financial COIs declared, while on further 
analysis, non-financial COIs were found for authors of 34 (35.8%) of the reviews. The 
two main reasons for the under-reporting seemed to be that many journals do not re-
quire disclosure of non-financial COI at all (33/50 journals) and that those journals that 
did require such a disclosure rarely asked for a specific type of non-financial COI or gave 
examples. Additionally, because non-financial COIs have attracted less attention than 
financial ones, researchers might not realize the effect of non-financial COIs and there-
fore not consider it necessary to declare them. We further found that a biased interpreta-
tion of results (spin) was found in 28% of the studied reviews and that reviews with a 
conclusion in favor of psychological therapies (vs. pharmacological interventions) were 
at a high risk for spin in their conclusions (OR=8.31; 1.41 to 49.05). This might be inter-
preted as a hint that authors of psychological reviews (who are mostly psychotherapists) 
overestimate the effects of “their own” therapies. However, this has to be taken with 
caution because we only found a trend for an association of spin in review conclusions 
with researcher allegiance or the inclusion of own primary studies by the review authors 			
49
   Alexander M. Clark et al., Addressing conflict of interest in non-pharmacological research, THE 
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CLINICAL PRACTICE, 69 (2015). 
50
  YAN LEYKIN & ROBERT  J. DERUBEIS, ALLEGIANCE IN PSYCHOTHERAPY OUTCOME RESEARCH: 
SEPARATING ASSOCIATION FROM BIAS (2009)  and Michael J Lambert, Are differential treatment effects 
inflated by researcher therapy allegiance? Could Clever Hans count?, CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY: SCIENCE AND 
PRACTICE , 6 (1999). 
51
  Elizabeth. A. Gaffan et al., Researcher allegiance and meta-analysis: the case of cognitive therapy for 
depression, THE JOURNAL OF CONSULTING AND CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY,  63 (1995) , Thomas  Munder et 
al., Testing the allegiance bias hypothesis: a meta-analysis, PSYCHOTHERAPY RESEARCH , 21 (2011) , and Scott 
Miller et al., Direct comparisons of treatment modalities for youth disorders: a meta-analysis, 18 see id. at  
(2008). 
52
  Thomas Munder et al., Researcher allegiance in psychotherapy outcome research: an overview of reviews, 
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY REVIEW, 33 (2013). 
53
  Klaus Lieb et al., Conflicts of interest and spin in reviews of psychological therapies: a systematic review, 
BRITISH MEDICAL JOURNAL OPEN,  (2016). 
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into the review. 
 
Considering that non-financial COIs may influence research conclusions similarly to 
financial COIs, it seems important to develop ways of improving their declaration. So 
far, there is no scientific consensus as to how non-financial interests should be declared 
or how best to ask for them. However, the scientific advisory board of psychotherapy 
(WBP) of the German medical association and the German Federal Chamber of Psycho-
therapists has recently recognized the need for such declarations. The WBP  is a scientific 
board made up of medical doctors and psychologists that advises government agencies 
on the scientific approval of specific psychotherapies as well as the federal approval of 
training institutions for psychotherapy.54 In 2015, it composed suggestions for how to 
declare the COIs of its members starting in 2016. These suggestions have not yet been 
published, but table 1 gives a list of our suggestions on how non-financial COIs should 
best be declared. 
 
Employment 
Allegiance 
• Psychotherapeutic method (e.g. analytical psychotherapy, psychodynamic psychothera-
py or behavior therapy) in which the declaring person is trained 
• Psychotherapeutic method which the declaring person uses in his/her own current psy-
chotherapeutic practice 
• Psychotherapeutic methods which are established in the institute which the declaring 
person heads (i.e. as a director or attending physician in a hospital) 
Activity/shares in an education/training institute for psychotherapy 
Cooperation/personal relationships with the pharmaceutical industry or medical device manufac-
turers (non-financial) 
Research 
• Subject of research (psychotherapeutic techniques/methods; research on other non-
pharmacological methods for treatment of mental disorders; and pharmacological re-
search). 
• Public and non-public funding of research activities (e.g. German research Foundation 
(DFG), Federal Ministry for Education and Research (BMBF), other foundations as well 
as pharmaceutical industry or medical device manufacturers) 
Other activities 
• Activities in professional societies, professional associations, institutions of self-
government, professional bodies, other thematically relevant associations, patient sup-
port groups or others. 
Table 1. Proposal for the declaration of non-financial COIs – here for psychotherapists and re-
searchers on psychotherapy 			
54
  Wissenschaftlicher Beirat Psychotherapie, Wissenschaftlicher Beirat Psychotherapie, available at 
http://www.wbpsychotherapie.de/. 
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IV. MANAGEMENT OF CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN GERMANY 
 
  In principle, avoiding COIs completely would be the best way to ensure that they do 
not unduly influence professional decision-making. Although this is impossible consid-
ering their sheer frequency and the beneficial effects of some COIs, it is important to 
motivate all medical doctors and researchers to avoid situations that create a COI wher-
ever possible.  The fact that it is not possible to avoid COIs completely should not dis-
tract from this intention. 
 
However, as some COIs are unavoidable, it is important to manage them in order to 
mitigate their negative influence on professional decision-making to the highest possible 
degree. As mentioned above, transparency is an essential step on the way to managing 
COIs, but is not in itself effective in preventing their influence.55 In Germany, steps have 
been taken in several different areas to manage COIs. Following, we will describe initia-
tives to reduce publication bias, bias in early benefit assessment of new therapeutic strat-
egies, bias in the development of guidelines and bias in continuing medical education 
(CME). 
 
A. Management of Publication Bias through the German Clinical Trials Register 
(DRKS) 
 
One of the most influential biases that result from COIs is publication bias. Because 
pharmaceutical manufacturers have an interest mainly in publishing positive trial re-
sults, many trials – around 50% – are never published. It has been shown that those 
trials with a positive outcome are more likely to be published.56 This leads to a skewed 
evidence base for the succeeding assessment of benefits and risks of therapeutic strategies 
which overestimates the benefits of these strategies and underestimates the risks. One 
way of trying to reduce this bias is to mandate registration of clinical trials. While this 
does not ensure that they will be published, it still has several advantages that help to 
mitigate publication bias. Firstly, it makes it possible to at least analyze which trials have 
not been published and to contact the authors for results of those trials, i.e. when au-
thoring a systematic review. Secondly, it is usually possible to publish the study results 
on registries if no journal publication has appeared. Thirdly, it is possible to track 			
55
 Bernard Lo & Marilyn  J. Field, Free Executive Summary, in Conflict of Interest in Medical Research, 
Education, and Practice (Bernard Lo & Marilyn  J. Field eds., 2009), Holger. J. Schünemann et al., Guidelines 
International Network: Principles for Disclosure of Interests and Management of Conflicts in Guidelines, 
ANNALS OF INTERNAL MEDICINE, 163 (2015), and Klaus  Lieb, Transparency alone is not sufficient for the 
management of conflicts of interest - pro, PSYCHIATRISCHE PRAXIS 12, 42 (2015). 
56
  Annelieke M. Roest et al., Reporting Bias in Clinical Trials Investigating the Efficacy of Second-Generation 
Antidepressants in the Treatment of Anxiety Disorders: A Report of 2 Meta-analyses, THE JOURNAL OF 
AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION PSYCHIATRY, 72 (2015), Maria E. Flacco et al., Head-to-head 
randomized trials are mostly industry sponsored and almost always favor the industry sponsor, JOURNAL OF 
CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY,  (2015)  and Erick H. Turner et al., Selective publication of antidepressant trials 
and its influence on apparent efficacy, THE NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF MEDICINE,  358 (2008). 
			
	  COMPLIANCE  ELLIANCE  JOURNAL   |   VOLUME 2   NUMBER 2   2016 
CORA KOCH, GISELA SCHOTT, DAVID KLEMPERER, THOMAS LEMPERT, WOLF-DIETER LUDWIG & KLAUS LIEB |   
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN MEDICINE AND THEIR MANAGEMENT 
 
PAGE  19 
whether the (primary) outcomes of a trial that are published correspond with the prede-
fined outcomes mentioned in the registration. Adding, revising, or failing to publish 
certain outcomes of trials can skew the results available to the public and is quite a 
common practice.57 
 
In several countries, such as the US, Switzerland and India, it is therefore legally required 
to register all clinical trials. In Germany, this only applies to those clinical trials that are 
subject to the Medicines Act (AMG) or the Medical Device Act (MPG).58 However, 
since 2007 the possibility exists to register any clinical trial on the German Clinical Trials 
Register (DRKS), the WHO primary registry for Germany. It is a cooperation of the 
Department for Medical Biometrics and Medical Informatics of the University of Frei-
burg and was funded initially by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research 
(BMBF).59 Funding by the BMBF had to be discontinued by July 2016 due to the regula-
tions of the BMBF on project funding. At the time of writing, negotiations were un-
derway with the Federal Ministry of Health to find sustainable funding options for the 
DRKS.60 
 
For the management of publication bias, it is essential that the DRKS remains function-
ing. It is the only registry that gives an overview of clinical trials in Germany. It is there-
fore also a good resource for patients, practitioners and researchers in Germany who 
want to search the evidence regarding a certain condition or drug or who want to find 
trials that might offer patients access to novel therapies. The fact that all trials can be 
registered means that even trials that are not subject to the AMG/MPG can be searched. 
And because the DRKS offers the possibility to submit data even if there was no publi-
cation on a certain trial means that one can gain access to a broader evidence base than 
by simply searching usual medical publication databases. 
 
B. Management of Conflicts of Interest in the Evaluation of Drugs and Medical 
Devices by the DCGMA 
 
In Germany, the DCGMA is one of the few organizations that are authorized to com-
ment on the early benefit assessment of newly approved pharmaceuticals.61 This has 			
57
  Ben Goldacre et al., The COMPare Trials Project (2016). 
58
  Gesetzgeber, Gesetz über den Verkehr mit Arzneimitteln - Arzneimittelgesetz  (1976, letzte Änderung 2014). 
and Gesetzgeber, Gesetz über Medizinprodukte (Medizinproduktegesetz - MPG),  (1994, letzte Änderung 
2015). 
59
  Susanne Jena, DRKS- Deutsches Register Klinischer Studien (German Clinical Trials Register), available at 
https://drks-neu.uniklinik-freiburg.de/drks_web/setLocale_EN.do. 
60
  Hinnerk Feldwisch-Drentrup, Gesundheitspolitiker wollen Studien-Register retten, DEUTSCHE APOTHEKER 
ZEITUNG, 2016. 
61
  Bundesministerium für Gesundheit, Bekanntmachung eines Beschlusses des Gemeinsamen Bundesausschusses 
über die Bestimmung von Stellungnahmeberechtigten nach §92 Absatz 3a des Fünften Buches Sozialgesetzbuch 
(SGB V), 58 BUNDESANZEIGER (2009). 
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direct repercussions for the ensuing price negotiations with the drug manufacturer and 
the definition of a price that will be refunded by statutory health insurance. As was 
described in detail above, the DCGMA has initiated a high level of transparency regard-
ing COIs. Taking this as a first step, the DCGMA has moved further to formulate rules 
for the management of COIs that are adapted from the suggestions of the 2009 IOM 
report.62 
 
The main principles of the DCGMA rules for managing COIs are to reduce the propor-
tion of members with COIs in regard to the pharmaceutical or therapeutic strategy be-
ing assessed and to reduce the amount of influence on decisions by conflicted members. 
With regard to the first point, the DCGMA aims to create a committee of members free 
of COIs when performing a benefit/risk analysis for a newly approved drug. Should this 
be impossible, at least the chairman of the committee has to be free of COIs for the last 
three years and the proportion of members with COIs should not exceed one third. The 
DCGMA does acknowledge that it might sometimes be necessary to include members 
with close industry contacts because of their expertise; in research, cooperation with 
industry is common and while leading to COIs, it may also have benefits. Excluding 
experts with COIs completely might therefore lead to a loss of scientific expertise. 
Members with very close personal relationships, such as members of speaking bureaus 
or shareholders in pharmaceutical companies, however, are excluded from the assess-
ments in any case. To reduce the amount of influence of members with COIs, they are 
not allowed to be part of the decision-making process and are not allowed to formulate 
the text of the final statement of the DCGMA regarding a new drug or medical device.63 
  
To decide whether a COI is relevant to the assessment of a drug, the DCGMA looks for 
relationships with the company producing the original drug, as well as companies pro-
ducing generic versions and all competitor companies. If a whole class of substances is 
being assessed, relationships with the corresponding companies are considered to be 
relevant. COIs of DCGMA members are evaluated by the board of directors of the 
DCGMA. As mentioned above, physicians tend to underestimate their own bias, so it is 
essential that a third party judges the relevance of a COI for the respective task.64 
 
In sum, DCGMA rules try to ensure a balance between ensuring access to all relevant 
expertise, while guarding a distance between possibly biased members and decision-
making so that decisions remain as free as possible from undue influence. 			
62
 Bernard Lo & Marilyn  J. Field, Free Executive Summary, in Conflict of Interest in Medical Research, 
Education, and Practice (Bernard Lo & Marilyn  J. Field eds., 2009) and Arzneimittelkommission der 
deutschen Ärzteschaft, Regeln zum Umgang mit Interessenkonflikten bei Mitgliedern der 
Arzneimittelkommission der deutschen Ärzteschaft (2014) available  at 
http://www.akdae.de/Kommission/Organisation/Statuten/Interessenkonflikte/Regeln.pdf. 
63
   Arzneimittelkommission der deutschen Ärzteschaft, Regeln zum Umgang mit Interessenkonflikten bei 
Mitgliedern der Arzneimittelkommission der deutschen Ärzteschaft  (2014). 
64
  Id. at. 
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C. Management of Conflicts of Interest in the Development of Guidelines 
 
Guidelines are some of the most influential documents in health care, as they inform 
doctors’ decisions regarding diagnostic and treatment strategies. Non-adherence may 
have legal consequences as guidelines are often used as the basis for arguments in mal-
practice suits. It therefore seems obvious that it is important to keep guidelines free from 
bias caused by secondary interests. 
 
There are some international data to suggest that guidelines can be influenced when 
authors have COIs.65 In Germany, studies have been published that assessed transparen-
cy of COIs of guideline panel members in German guidelines66 and possible bias in 
current guidelines through panel members with conflicting interests.67 Guideline devel-
opment in Germany is coordinated by the Association of Scientific Medical Societies 
(AWMF), and rules for the declaration of COIs were released in 2010.68 A study by 
Langer and colleagues in 2012 found that among guidelines published between 2009 and 
2011, the frequency of declarations of COIs increased markedly from 8% to about 94% 
after the rules had taken effect.69 However, only 50% of guidelines described assessing 
the relevance of COIs; and in most cases, the authors of the guidelines rated the rele-
vance of their own COIs. Only one of the studied guidelines described how the risk of 
bias through COIs was minimized. Another study by our own group assessed guidelines 
that resulted from a less formal process of expert consensus (so called S1 guidelines) that 
were released after 2010.70 In more than 90% of the guidelines, COI declarations were 
given; COIs were most commonly memberships in a specialist society or professional 
association and 50% of experts had declared financial COIs. However, only 11% of the 
guidelines described assessing the declared COIs and only in one case did a COI lead to 
consequences for the conflicted member. 			
65
 See Lorraine Johnson & Raphael B. Stricker, Attorney General forces Infectious Diseases Society of America 
to redo Lyme guidelines due to flawed development process, JOURNAL OF MEDICAL ETHICS,  35 (2009)  and 
Paivi Hietanen, Does the expert panel at the St Gallen meeting provide an unbiased opinion about the 
management of women with early breast cancer?, ANNALS OF ONCOLOGY,  20 (2009)  for recent examples. 
66
  Thomas Langer et al., Conflicts of interest among authors of medical guidelines: an analysis of guidelines 
produced by German specialist societies, DEUTSCHES ÄRZTEBLATT INTERNATIONAL,  109 (2012) and  Gisela 
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Another study of our group demonstrated that the German clinical practice guideline 
for psoriasis vulgaris gives a stronger recommendation for the use of efalizumab and 
considers the evidence base to be better than guidelines developed by more independent 
institutions.71 This correlated with the fact that many of the German authors contrib-
uting to the guideline had financial COIs with regard to efalizumab. While this study 
did not prove causality of influence of COI on the guideline, it does suggest that authors 
with COI give different recommendations than those without, to the possible detriment 
of patients. 
 
The initiative “Leitlinienwatch”72 has started to rate the transparency and management 
of COIs in guidelines published by the AWMF.  The initiative assesses guidelines with 
regard to transparency, proportion of members of the guideline group with COIs, inde-
pendence of the lead authors, chairmen and coordinators, abstention from voting by 
members with COI and external review of the guideline by the scientific public or pa-
tient representatives. In addition, they give “bonus points” when further measures to 
reduce bias through COIs have been documented, such as a search for authors without 
COIs, a system of assessment of COIs, etc.  Of the 116 guidelines that have so far been 
assessed, only 11 guidelines received a rating of “good” (the best rating), while 53 guide-
lines received a rating of “reform necessary”.73 However, this sample is not representative 
of the 755 guidelines that are in effect, the method has not been validated or scientifically 
published and does not cover all efforts by the AWMF to reduce bias. 
 
In conclusion, while there has been progress on the transparency of COIs in guideline 
development in Germany, there is still a lot of work to be done regarding their manage-
ment. 
 
The 2010 rules of the AWMF regarding the management of COIs in guideline develop-
ment were a good step toward better management but remain rather unspecific.74 They 
recommend that members of a guideline development group with a relevant COI 
should not participate in the decision making process. However, it is relatively vague 
who should assess the relevance of a COI and what the criteria for such relevance are. 
The rules also suggest that authors of guidelines should only have COIs with a small 
potential for bias, though how this judgment is made also remains unclear. The current 
rules are therefore under revision and the AWMF is planning to model new rules on the 			
71
  Gisela Schott et al., Deklaration und Umgang mit Interessenkonflikten in deutschen Leitlinien, DEUTSCHES 
ÄRZTEBLATT INTERNATIONAL,  112 (2013). 
72
  Leitlinienwatch. Das Transparenzportal für medizinische Behandlungsleitlinien, available at 
www.leitlinienwatch.de. 
73
  Id. at., accessed July 14th 2016. 
74
  The rules formulated concerning transparency are more specific and there is little to criticize in this regard.  
Arbeitsgemeinschaft Wissenschaftlicher Medizinischer Fachgesellschaften (AMWF), Empfehlungen zum 
Umgang mit Interessenkonflikten bei Fachgesellschaften (2010).  
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recommendations of the Guidelines International Network (GIN) that have recently 
been published75. At the time of writing, the new rules were not yet published. There-
fore, following we will give some recommendations to refine the AWMF rules based on 
the GIN-recommendations,76 the recommendations of the IOM77 as well as the 
DCGMA rules.78 
 
Firstly, medical specialist societies should make every effort to find experts for the devel-
opment of guidelines that are free of COIs, similar to the commitment made by the 
DCGMA and as recommended by GIN. This will lead to an emphasis on independence 
from the very beginning of the process. Similarly, it is essential to define the proportion 
of members of a guideline development group that must be free of COIs to ensure a 
balance between conflicted members and those without conflicts, as recommended by 
the IOM and the DCGMA. Secondly, special effort should be made to find guideline 
coordinators who are free of COIs. Some might criticize that it is not possible to find 
such a coordinator; however, this is mostly based on the argument that those with con-
siderable research expertise often have COIs. We believe that those experts with primari-
ly clinical experience have just as much to add to the development of guidelines, while 
being conflicted less often. Members with research experience and COIs are welcome to 
add their expertise in the role of external advisers, but should not be in a leadership posi-
tion. Thirdly, it is important to ensure that no guideline panel member assesses his or 
her own COIs, as most people tend to underestimate their own bias.79 It would make 
sense to establish a panel within the AWMF that assesses the COIs of guideline-
coordinators. In turn, coordinators free of COIs could then decide to appoint members 
within the guideline development group or outside of it as “COI-managers”, who would 
be in charge of assessing COIs and implementing rules for the management of COIs, as 
was suggested by the GIN. Fourthly, we would welcome the establishment of a system 
of “grading” COIs as to their severity, meaning the likelihood that they will lead to un-
due influence on decision making.  This could then have different consequences, i.e. 
members with very severe COIs could be completely excluded from the panel while 
members with COIs that are unlikely to lead to a relevant bias might only be excluded 
from leadership positions within the guideline development group while being allowed 
to participate in discussions. 
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  Holger J. Schünemann et al.,  Guidelines International Network: Principles for Disclosure of Interests and 
Management of Conflicts in Guidelines, ANNALS OF INTERNAL MEDICINE,  (2015). 
76
  Id. at. 
77
  Bernard Lo & Marilyn  J. Field, Free Executive Summary, in Conflict of Interest in Medical Research, 
Education, and Practice (Bernard Lo & Marilyn  J. Field eds., 2009). 
78
   Arzneimittelkommission der deutschen Ärzteschaft, Regeln zum Umgang mit Interessenkonflikten bei 
Mitgliedern der Arzneimittelkommission der deutschen Ärzteschaft  (2014). 
79
  Joyce Ehrlinger et al., Peering Into the Bias Blind Spot: People's Assessments of Bias in Themselves and 
Others, PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN, 680 (2005). 
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D. Management of Conflicts of Interest in Continuing Medical Education 
 
Globally, around 33% of all accredited events in continuing medical education (CME) 
are funded by pharmaceutical companies.80 For Germany, there are no exact figures, but 
many CME-events are funded at least in part by pharmaceutical or medical device man-
ufacturers, and often the speakers involved have financial COIs even if the event is not 
sponsored by a company. In both cases, the risk is increased that speakers will present 
biased information.81 
 
In Germany, CME has to be accredited by the state medical associations. There is a 
guideline on accreditation that mentions that the content of the event has to be inde-
pendent from “economic interests” as a prerequisite for accreditation.82 COIs of the or-
ganizer, the scientific supervisor and the speakers have to be declared to the medical 
associations and the event’s participants. However, these rules are relatively vague on 
how the influence of CME content by economic interests is to be avoided. For doctors it 
is therefore currently difficult to recognize which events are truly independent. 
 
The DCGMA is one organization that regularly organizes CME events and in 2015 initi-
ated rules to ensure their independence.83 These rules are stricter than internationally 
proposed suggestions regarding the independence of CME.84 One of the main require-
ments for a CME event to be considered independent by the DCGMA is that it is spon-
sored neither directly nor indirectly by a pharmaceutical or medical device manufactur-
er. Indirect sponsoring describes when a pharmaceutical manufacturer transfers funds to 
an organization or a hospital, which in turn organizes the CME event, instead of organ-
izing the event directly. The second important requirement is that speakers have not 
received personal remuneration from a pharmaceutical or medical device manufacturer 
for at least two years. It is important to note that an exception is made for speakers who 
have research relationships with industry and have therefore received funding from 
industry. In this case, it is important that the funds were/are only used for research, that 			
80
  Julie Simper, Cologne Consensus Conference, Management of conflict of interest, 12 and 13 September 2014, 
Cologne, Germany, JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN CME, 4 (2015). 
81
  Nils Schneider et al., Interessenkonflikte in der ärztlichen Aus-, Weiter- und Fortbildung und Vorschläge zu 
deren Minimierung, in Interessenkonflikte in der Medizin. Hintergründe und Lösungsmöglichkeiten. 
(Klaus Lieb et al. eds., 2011). 
82
 Bundesärztekammer, (Muster-)Fortbildungsordnung 2013 (2013), available at 
http://www.bundesaerztekammer.de/fileadmin/user_upload/downloads/_Muster-
_Fortbildungsordnung_29052013.pdf. 
83
  Klaus Lieb, Regeln für unabhängige ärztliche AkdÄ-Fortbildungsveranstaltungen (2015), available at 
http://www.akdae.de/Fortbildung/Regeln.pdf. 
84
  Julie Simper, Cologne Consensus Conference, Management of conflict of interest, 12 and 13 September 2014, 
Cologne, Germany, JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN CME, 4 (2015)  describes examples by the American Accredita-
tion Council for CME (ACCME) and Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons in Canada. 
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they were/are managed by third party funding accounts and that no money has gone to 
the speaker personally. While this type of cooperation also creates COIs, speakers that 
have research experience also bring valuable expertise to a CME event. In this case, the 
DCGMA judges that it is worth taking the risk of bias to profit from the expertise of 
these speakers. Additionally, the DCGMA has defined rules to ensure that the content 
of an event be as balanced as possible. These rules are modeled after suggestions by Lo 
and Ott.85 Speakers should: 
 
• Discuss all alternative therapeutic strategies (including generic medication and 
life style changes, among others) 
• Describe systematic reviews, meta-analyses and recommendations by independ-
ent institutions as evidence base 
• Describe advantages and disadvantages of the discussed therapeutic strategies  
• Mention limitations of the evidence base  
• Not use presentations or suggestions for talks designed by a pharmaceuti-
cal/medical device manufacturer. 
 
Lastly, the DCGMA requires speakers to declare their COIs during the event, with ade-
quate time for the participants to discuss these COIs and their relevance. In addition, 
the scientific supervisor of the event is required to let the participants evaluate the event, 
including an evaluation of its potential bias. 
 
While it is unclear whether such strict rules can be implemented within all CME events, 
it is important that the DCGMA has taken this step to ensure the independence of their 
events. We hope that this will influence other CME organizers to reconsider their rules 
with regard to the management of COIs. 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
To summarize, there are several promising developments in Germany regarding the 
management of COIs. Especially the transparency of COIs has improved markedly with-
in the last few years, at least in some organizations such as the DCGMA and the 
AWMF. Research has begun to shed some light on the frequency of doctor-industry 
interactions in Germany. Other parties have begun to follow the lead set by the 
DCGMA requiring a high level of transparency from their members and the AWMF’s 
approach of improving transparency of COIs in guideline-development. Even many 
pharmaceutical manufacturers have advocated a higher level of transparency, which is a 
welcome development despite several flaws of their proposal. 
 
The management of COIs has also made progress, but there still remains a lot to be 			
85
  Bernard Lo & Chelsea Ott, What is the enemy in CME, conflicts of interest or bias?,  THE JOURNAL OF 
AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, 310 (2013). 
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done. However, the DCGMA has taken on an important role in this domain as well, 
serving as an example in their early benefit assessment as well as in the organization of 
CME. It remains to be seen whether the ideas of the DCGMA on independent CME 
will have a positive impact on the broader CME-community; this would be an essential 
step forward and help doctors to base their decisions on evidence-based information. 
Further developments from the AWMF and the WBP concerning management of COIs 
and transparency of non-financial COIs will hopefully be finalized soon, adding to the 
momentum towards more evidence-based decision-making in medicine in Germany. 
While the future of the German Clinical Trials Register is uncertain at the moment, one 
can hope that when sustainable funding is secured, it can continue to diminish publica-
tion bias in Germany.  
 
There are still many areas of healthcare in Germany where COIs remain unaddressed, 
however. Transparency in regard to medical device manufacturers remains extremely 
low; there has been no self-regulation regarding transparency in this area. Similarly, 
there has been little effort to address COIs in early medical education, even though our 
survey showed that medical students already interact with the pharmaceutical industry. 
Non-financial COIs have also barely been addressed outside of psychotherapy and much 
work remains to be done on improving their transparency, for example by developing 
better survey instruments. Even less explored has been the question of management of 
non-financial COIs. While in some cases, strategies similar to the ones used for financial 
COIs can be used to reduce bias, in other cases, new strategies will have to be developed. 
All in all, Germany is catching up with the international COI-discussion. The current 
developments raise hopes that medical professionals will continue to strengthen their 
independence from secondary interests to the benefit of the patients that depend on 
their expertise. 
